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Deeds-Priority of Description-Practical Location
In the recent North Carolina case of Brown v. Hodges,1 plaintiff
and defendant were adjoining landowners, deriving their respective
titles from a common source. A dispute arose as to the boundary line
between them.2 The pertinent call in the deed under which defendant
claims was, "thence

. .

. west with the highway 50 poles to a stake at

the highway." The pertinent call in plaintiff's deed was the reverse of
this call, but identical with it. Plaintiff alleged that the true line ran
with the original survey of the highway, and not with the highway as it
existed at the time of the execution of the deeds, and as it now exists.
He was permitted to show by parol evidence, over defendant's objection,
that a surveyor for plaintiff's predecessors in title had found "stakes for
a road" along the line as contended for by plaintiff. There was no evidence that this surveyor marked the line or marked a corner at the end
of the line as run by him. No road was ever constructed on the site of
the original survey.
At trial defendant requested peremptory instruction in his favor;
the request was denied, and verdict was rendered for plaintiff. On
appeal the court held that the trial court erred in admitting parol testimony tending to vary the calls in the deeds, and granted a new trial.
The volume of litigation involving questions relative to boundaries
of land has resulted in some well established principles as to priority of
descriptions in 'deeds.
Practical location by the parties3 When it can be proved that the
parties grantor and grantee went upon the land and made a physical
survey thereof, giving it a boundary that was actually run and marked,
and a corner made, 4 the party claiming under the deed shall hold accordingly, notwithstanding a variant -description on the face of the instrument. 5 The act of practical location, however, does not, ipso facto,
admit parol testimony. It must be shown that the boundary monuments
were erected prior to, or contemporaneously with, the execution of the
deed, before such evidence is admissible. 6 A definite minority of juris1232 N. C. 537, 61 S. E. 2d 603 (1950), rehearing denied, 233 N. C. 617, 65 S. E.
2d 144 (1951). The case was heard on a prior occasion and reported in 230 N. C.
746, 55 S. E. 2d 498 (1949).
Title to the respective tracts was not in dispute.
' "Practical location" as here treated involves grantor and grantee.
For discussion of "practical location," i.e., settlement of boundary dispute between adjoining land owners by location and acquiescence, see Comment, 21 YALE L. J. 509
(1912).
'Brown v. Hodges, 233 N. C. 617, 65 S. E. 2d 144 (1951) (Giving to a line a
permanent location and to a corner a permanent position).
The practical location rule in North Carolina is treated as an exception to
the general rule that monuments mentioned in a deed are to be accorded first preference. Yopp v. Aman, 212 N. C. 479, 193 S. E. 822 (1937) ; Dudley v. Jeffress,
178 N. C. 111, 100 S. E. 253 (1919); Clarke v. Aldridge, 162 N. C. 326, 78 S. E.
216 (1913) ; Cherry v. Slade, 7 N. C. 82 (1819).
Yopp v. Aman, 212 N. C. 479, 193 S. E. 822 (1937); Watford v. Pierce, 188
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

dictions give effect to monuments designated after execution of the
7
deed.
It is a patent violation of the parol evidence rule to allow oral testimony of practical location to contradict and control the written description in a deed. The North Carolina court has recognized it as such,
and has on occasion lamented the fact as leading to fraud and to insecurity of titles ;8 its application continues, nevertheless.
Monuments. Calls in a deed for monuments, natural9 or artificial,' 0
control calls for course and distance, and the lines terminate at the
former, regardless of the distance specified." The rationale for this is
that for any number of reasons course and 'distance may be incorrect,
but monuments, being objects of immutability, are more likely to conform to grantor's intention. A stake has never been accorded the dignity of a monument in North Carolina, and consequently, for purposes
of practical location, has never been the basis for varying the construction of a written deed. 12 Justice Hall, concurring in Reed v. Shenck,13
speaking of stakes, said, "they bespeak more of locality, to be sure, than
floating feathers on the water, but they are as unfit to be boundaries of
N. C. 430, 124 S. E. 838 (1924); Ritter Lumber Co. v. Montvale Lumber Co.,
169 N. C. 80, 85 S. E. 438 (1915) ; Clarke v. Aldridge, 162 N. C. 326, 78 S. E. 216
(1913) ; Higdon v. Rice, 119 N. C. 623, 26 S. E. 256 (1896) ; Reed v. Shenck,
13 N. C. 415 (1830); Bradford v. Hill, 2 N. C. 22 (1793).
Bemis v. Bradley, 126 Me. 462, 139 At. 593 (1927) ; In Manchester v. Hodge,

74 N. H. 468, 69 Atl. 527 (1908), the court followed the minority view, but inti-

mated it believed the monument had been erected prior to the execution of the
deed.
8 "But it must be confessed, however much to be lamented, that our courts have
permitted parol evidence to contradict a deed. . .

."

Slade v. Green, 9 N. C. 218,

224 (1822); Potter v. Bonner, 174 N. C. 20, 93 S.E. 370 (1917); Allison v.
Kenion, 163 N. C. 582, 79 S. E. 1110 (1913).
'The following, but not by way of limitation, have been held to be natural
monuments: Byrd v. Spruce Co., 170 N. C. 429, 87 S. E. 241 (1915) (creek);
Lumber Co. v. Bernhardt, 162 N. C. 460, 78 S.E. 485 (1913) (established line of

adjacent tract) ; Plemmons v. Cutshell, 234 N. C. 506, S. E. 2d (1951)
(same) ; Sherrod v. Battle, 154 N. C. 345, 70 S.E. 834 (1911) (ditch, drain and

water course) ; McNeely v. Laxton, 149 N. C. 327, 63 S.E. 278 (1908) (tree) ;
Clark v. Moore, 126 N. C. 1, 35 S.E. 125 (1900) (fort entrenchment and marl
pit); Clarke v. Wagner, 76 N. C. 463 (1877) (island); Literary Fund v. Clark,
31 N. C. 58 (1848) (lake and mountains); Hough v. Home, 20 N. C. 369 (1839)
(highway); Reed v. Shenck, 13 N. C. 415 (1830) (rocks); Pollock v. Harris, 2
N. C. 252 (1796) (marsh, pocosin and swamp) ; Sandifer v. Foster, 2 N. C. 237

(1795) (river).
" Reed v. Shenck, 14 N. C. 65 (1831) (Some permanent monument, which will
endure for years, placed by the hand of man).
" Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S. E. 2d 257 (1945) ; Nelson v. Lineker,
172 N. C. 279, 90 S.E. 251 (1916) ; Cherry v. Slade, 7 N. C. 82 (1819) ; accord,
Schultz v. Maxey, 307 Ky. 325, 210 S.W. 2d 950 (1948) ; TrFFANY, THaE MODERN
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §673 (1940). But cf. White v. Luning, 93 U. S.514
(1876), for "absurdity theory," holding that monuments may yield to course and
distance if to follow the former would defeat the conveyance, whereby adherence
to the latter would effectuate all other parts of the description.
" Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S.E. 2d 257 (1945) ; Tate v. Johnson,
148 N. C. 267, 61 S.E. 741 (1908); Clark v. Moore, 126 N. C. 1, 35 S.E. 125
(1900); Reed v. Shenck, 14 N. C. 65 (1831).
1 14 N. C. 65, 75 (1831).
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land." A few states, however, with regard to the sufficiency of a stake
for such purposes, have held otherwise.' 4
Course and distance. Where there has been no practical location
by the parties to the instrument, or no monuments are called for in the
deed nor can be ascertained by evidence, then course and distance will
prevail over less certain descriptive elements.' 5 Between the two, course
is given priority.'1
Area. The courts are almost unanimous in holding that area or
quantity as an element of description could be significant, but they likewise infer that the possibility is a remote one since area or contents
called for is usually only an approximation. 17 Consequently, for all practical purposes, area is virtually disregarded.
In the principal case, then, it is readily apparent that the North
Carolina court reached a decision in accord, not only with prior rulings
in this jurisdiction, but with the decided weight of authority. Plaintiff's
argument, based on the application of the practical location rule, failed
when the court declared that stakes were not such monuments as to
satisfy the requisites of practical location, and therefore oral evidence
as to their erection was inadmissible. Defendant's contention, on the
other hand, that the highway as it existed at the time the deeds were
executed was the true boundary, found support in the fact that the
highway, i.e., monument, was called for in the deeds. No call for the
"survey of the highway," as contended for by plaintiff, was mentioned.
In light of the fact that application of the practical location doctrine violates the parol evidence rule, it is well that the North Carolina
Supreme Court did not permit further laxity in its scope.
HAL W. BROADrOOT.
Evidence-Automobiles--Identification of Driver
In ruling on a motion for judgment of non suit in a criminal case, 1
(iron stakes recognized by
1, Winbourne v. Russell, 50 So. 2d 721 (Ala. 1951)
the parties for 20 years); Arnold v. Hanson, 91 Cal. App. 2d 15, 204 P. 2d 97
(1949) (wood stakes driven by surveyor replaced with iron ones by subdivider);
Dean v. Thompson, 213 S.W. 2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
1 Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S.E. 2d 257 (1945) ; Cherry v. Slade,
7 N. C. 82 (1819) ; accord, Wagers v. Wagers, 238 S. W. 2d 125 (Ky. 1951);
TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note 11, §673.
1" Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S. E. 2d 257 (1945) ; accord, Forest
416, 58 N. E. 2d 538 (1944). See
Preserve District v. Lehmann Estate, 388 Ill.
TFANY, op. cit. smpra note 11, §673, where it is stated that between course and
distance there is no preference, citing Hall v. Eaton, 139 Mass. 217, 29 N. E. 660
(1885).
" Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S.E. 2d 257 (1945) ; accord, Hollars
v. Stephenson, 99 N. E. 2d 258 (Ind. 1951); Askins v. Oil Producing Co., 201
Okla. 209, 203 P. 2d 877 (1949) ; Parrow v. Proulx, 111 Vt. 274, 15 A. 2d 835
(1940) ; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 11, §673.
1
N. C. GEN. STAT. §15-173 (Supp. 1951) provides for criminal law non suit
and serves the same purpose in criminal prosecutions as is accomplished by N. C.
GEN. STAT. §1-183 (Supp. 1951) in civil actions. State v. Ormond, 211 N. C. 437,

